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‘Straightening What’s Crooked’? Recognition as Moral
Disruption in Indonesia’s Confucianist Revival
Nicholas J. Long
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
ABSTRACT
In 2006, the Indonesian state re-recognised Confucianism as an
official religion, but this did not have the straightforwardly
positive consequences that either Confucianist revivalists or some
theorists of recognition might have predicted. Revivalists were
often – but not always – gripped by feelings of outrage and moral
torment, whilst the pace of the revival itself was very uneven.
These varied outcomes reflect the complex politics pervading the
lives of Indonesian Confucianists (and Chinese Indonesians more
generally) as post-Suharto reforms force them to grapple with
their diverse histories of accommodation and resistance to the
New Order’s discriminatory policies. To fully understand such
material, first-person moral perspectives must be incorporated
into critical anthropological studies of recognition, as a
complement to approaches focused on power and domination.
Doing so reveals an important general truth about recognition –
its capacity to be morally disruptive – and broadens our
understanding of why recognition can hurt those it ostensibly
stands to benefit.
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Introduction
Now that Chinese New Year has entered round seven,
It’s time to strike the gavel,
It’s time to straighten what’s crooked,
It’s time for consciences to speak out,
It’s time to act on empathy,
So that couples in love no longer feel sorrow,
So that kids are no longer depressed,
And state documents record the truth of people’s faith!
Happy New Year, my brothers.
May all your sorrows turn into happiness.
(Tanuwibowo 2012)
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Budi Tanuwibowo, a senior figure in Indonesia’s Confucianist revival, first performed this
poem in 2006, five days after the Ministry of Religion had confirmed it was prepared to re-
recognise Confucianism as a religion, and less than a month before the Ministry of Home
Affairs would do the same. It reveals his aspirations for ‘round seven’: Indonesia’s seventh
decade since independence. Several lines refer to formal measures for which Confucianists
had long been campaigning – the recognition of Confucianist marriages for ‘couples in
love’, and the provision of Confucianist religious education in schools. Significantly, the
poem presents these as embedded within a broader affective transformation from a life
of ‘sorrows’ to a life of ‘happiness’. Through re-recognition, it suggests, depression at injus-
tice can give way to the pleasures of ‘straightening what’s crooked’.
To date, however, Tanuwibowo’s hopes for post-recognition affect have come to cur-
iously inconsistent fruition. Some Indonesian Confucianists have been able to experience,
relatively unadulterated, the pleasures of their religion’s re-recognition. For others, re-rec-
ognition has not only failed to extinguish feelings of ‘sorrow’ and ‘depression’, but has pre-
cipitated new feelings of moral anguish. In this article, I examine why such varied responses
to Confucianism’s re-recognition have emerged, and why they are distributed as they are. I
thereby show how a critical anthropology of recognition and its consequences might valu-
ably combine its long-standing attention to power and domination with perspectives
focused on the phenomenological analysis of moral experience, particularly the complex-
ities that social actors can face in their efforts to enact ‘good’, praiseworthy or virtuous
lives. I argue that recognition has an intrinsic capacity to disrupt subjects’ moral projects,
and that by examining the experiential consequences of such disruption, one can account
for affective responses to Confucianism’s re-recognition that are not readily explained by
approaches focusing on power relations. Attention to moral disruption may thus, I
suggest, also prove valuable when studying recognition’s receipt elsewhere.
Confucianism and Its ‘Revival’
A heterogeneous assemblage of theological claims, ethical precepts and ritual practices
informed by the writings and teachings of Confucius, Confucianism is considered a reli-
gion (agama) by its Indonesian adherents – although its status as such has had a complex
history in their nation’s public life (Chambert-Loir 2015, 79–80). Indonesia has a consti-
tutional commitment to religiosity: the first pillar of the Pancasila, Indonesia’s civic phil-
osophy, is ‘Belief in the One and Only God’ (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), and all citizens
must adhere to a state-recognised monotheistic religion. The Indonesian state initially
accepted Confucianism as one such religion, withdrawing this status in 1952 but reinstat-
ing it in 1965. Shortly afterwards, Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime came to
power against a backdrop of anti-communist violence that periodically ‘took a strong
anti-Chinese turn’ (Chong 2016, 100) and issued a series of rulings aimed at ‘assimilating’
Indonesia’s Chinese minority. One of these, Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967,
restricted the practice of ‘Chinese devotional practices’ to the family circle and stated
that ‘Chinese religious festivals’ should not be performed ‘glaringly in public’. Confucian-
ism’s place in the nation became highly precarious. By 1979, Confucianism had been
officially derecognised, and Confucianists were required to adopt an alternative religious
affiliation – usually Buddhism, but sometimes Christianity or Islam. Only after Suharto’s
resignation in 1998 were these measures gradually reversed.
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Confucianism’s eventual re-recognition in 2006 was, like previous reversals of anti-
Chinese legislation, a significant event in the lives of Chinese Indonesians, even those
who were not Confucianist themselves. It contributed to what scholars and the Indonesian
media have labelled ‘the Chinese euphoria’ – a term referring to both the rising assertion of
Chinese identities and cultural forms in the Indonesian public sphere and the joyful affects
underpinning it (Coppel 2003, 330–332). Such sentiments were exemplified by a Chinese
shopkeeper from the Riau Islands who exuberantly told me democracy was ‘great’. ‘We
have our human rights’, he elaborated, ‘We have our Chinese New Year. We have our
Confucianism. Democracy is brilliant!’
Those directly involved in the Confucianist revival were similarly euphoric – at first.
They expressed delight that their freedom of religion was being upheld, and excitement
that organised Confucianism could enjoy a rosy future in Indonesia. Some still hold
such positive outlooks, but many now relate to Confucianism’s re-recognition far more
ambivalently. One moment, they might speak animatedly of how happy they had been
to witness their President attending a Confucianist event, or to see a Confucianist
temple included in South Jakarta’s ‘Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature’ theme park. The
next, their shoulders might slump as they lament how difficult their lives have become
since re-recognition, or rail angrily against the unfairness of the world.
Revivalists’ divergent affects partly reflected – and, as I will demonstrate, sometimes
accounted for – marked variation in the pace of the revival itself. Despite public
support for Confucianism’s re-recognition, most local revival movements have struggled
to attract participants. Table 1 compares the numbers of Indonesians identifying as Con-
fucianist in the 2010 census with the numbers recorded in 1971 – the last time ‘Confucian-
ism’ had been available as a census choice.1 The figures testify to Confucianism’s
decimation. Nevertheless, there is significant variability within this overall pattern of
decline. In some former Confucianist strongholds, such as East Java and Riau, contempor-
ary Confucianists number less than a twentieth of the numbers recorded forty years pre-
viously. In others, that figure comes closer to a fifth or a quarter. South Sumatra proves the
clearest outlier with a drop-off of ‘only’ 58 per cent.2
Clearly, to understand the full impact of post-Suharto Indonesia’s reforms, and what it
means to live as a Chinese Indonesian after the fall of the New Order, we need to move
Table 1. Numbers of Confucianists, as recorded in Indonesia’s 1971 and 2010 censuses.
Province
Number of Confucianists in
1971 census
Number of Confucianists in
2010 census
Percentage
change
East Java 162,059 5487 −96.6
Riau (including Riau Islands) 154,229 7612 −95.1
West Kalimantan 132,974 30,285 −77.2
Central Java 111,983 3010 −97.3
West Java (including Banten) 108,663 17,700 −83.7
South Sumatra (including
Bangka-Belitung)
100,659 41,954 −58.3
Jakarta 74,072 5165 −93.0
South Sulawesi (including West
Sulawesi)
26,918 463 −98.3
OTHER PROVINCES 100,576 6311 −93.7
ALL OF INDONESIA 972,133 117,987 −87.9
Note: Data are provided for the nation as a whole, and for the eight provinces that had the largest Confucianist populations
in the 1970s.
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beyond metanarratives such as ‘the Chinese euphoria’, which treat Indonesia’s Chinese as
an undifferentiated national mass, to ask why re-recognition sometimes generates pro-
found ambivalence, why different revivalists experience such ambivalence to such
different degrees, and how these forms of post-recognition experience are connected to
the variable progress of the revival as a whole. To do this, I draw on data collected
between 2006 and 2018 in the archipelago of Bangka-Belitung-Riau, located off Sumatra’s
east coast. This region houses a large population of Chinese Indonesians – mostly the des-
cendants of Hakka, Hokkien and Teochew tin miners, plantation workers and traders who
migrated there during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century (see Lyons
and Ford 2013; Somers Heidhues 1992). In the past, my interlocutors told me, ‘all the
Chinese [in Bangka-Belitung-Riau] were Confucianist’ – and yet the fortunes of its local
Confucianist revivals have varied hugely. Through a comparison of three such revivals,
I argue that the divergent affective and practical consequences of recognition both
reflect and contribute to a complex politics stemming from Chinese Indonesians’
varying histories of accommodation and resistance in the face of persecution. In the
process, I highlight the importance of attending to the possibility of moral disruption
when analysing the pleasures and miseries recognition can bring in its wake.
Recognition and Its Consequences
Over the past three decades, social and political theory has undergone what Assmann
(2013, 73) labels a ‘recognition turn’, in which the significance of intersubjective recog-
nition for identity formation and lived experience has been increasingly emphasised.
Drawing on Hegelian philosophy, symbolic interactionism and relational psychoanalysis,
recognition theorists contend that self-construction requires the other to recognise and
affirm the identity of the self (Assmann 2013, 74), thereby moving beyond the portrait
of the monadic, self-interested subject that dominated much twentieth-century social
thought and offering new perspectives on ethical life. Honneth (1995, 172–173), for
example, argues that interpersonal and institutional recognition are ‘the intersubjective
conditions under which human subjects reach various new ways of relating positively
to themselves’ and are thus essential ‘structural elements’ of the good life (see also
Keane 2016, 25; Lambek 2010, 31). Conversely, their failure, whether because of misrecog-
nition, nonrecognition, or derecognition, is said to inflict ‘real damage… imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being’ and generating a ‘moral
tension that can set social conflicts in motion’ (Honneth 1995, 162; Taylor 1994, 25).
Honneth (1995, 173–174) therefore advances a normative argument for granting legal rec-
ognition where it has previously been foreclosed, arguing that its receipt can offer ‘the pro-
spect of self-respect’, increase ‘the extent of one’s positive relation-to-self’ and, ultimately,
facilitate ‘a successful life’.
When such ideas have a public life, they can significantly shape people’s ethical aware-
ness and horizons of expectation. In Native North America, the concept of federal recog-
nition has ‘acquired a transformational aura, seemingly able to lift tribes from poverty and
cultural decay’ (Klopotek 2011, 5), just as Budi Tanuwibowo believed re-recognition
would offer Indonesian Confucianists a pathway to ‘happiness’. Testimonies of ‘elation’
after securing recognition (Klopotek 2011, 166–167) indicate that such predictions can
hold true for some people, some of the time. Often, however, the lives which unfold in
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recognition’s wake do not feel particularly ‘successful’ or ‘positive’ to those that live them.
Anthropologists have typically traced this outcome to the power dynamics in which rec-
ognition relationships are embedded, an issue normative recognition theory largely
neglects.
Some authors note, for instance, that recognition policies typically proceed from and
performatively reiterate a political ontology in which nation-states have the sovereign
right to determine who is included within a polity, and on what terms. Such arrangements
can actively ‘diminish opportunities for self-realisation’ (Balaton-Chrimes and Stead 2017,
7), for example by undermining indigenous populations’ own claims to sovereignty and
nationhood and thereby reproducing ‘the very configurations of colonial… power that
indigenous people’s demands for recognition have historically sought to transcend’
(Coulthard 2014, 3). In such circumstances, the politics of recognition can be met with
outrage and refusal (Simpson 2014). Indonesian Confucianists, however, do not dispute
the sovereignty or legitimacy of the nation-state. Indeed, Siegel (1997, 7) suggests that
Indonesians often ‘feel that the recognition the nation offers is essential to them’.
Though social scientists may wish to normatively critique the political arrangements
that recognition upholds, their perpetuation is not, by itself, sufficient to explain the
moral ambivalence that recognition elicited for my interlocutors.
Two further critiques of recognition, also focused on power relations, are more directly
relevant to the Confucianist case. The first argues that, even when recognition is con-
sidered legitimate, the conditionality of its receipt renders it a ‘form of domination’ (Povi-
nelli 2002, 6). The second examines how power relations endow subjects with differential
capacities to respond positively to recognition’s receipt (McNay 2008). As I now show,
both of these arguments can illuminate certain aspects of the Confucianist case – but ulti-
mately need to be complemented by an approach focused on recognition’s inherent
capacity for moral disruption.
The Conditionality of Recognition
Recognition is always conditional; the norms by which one seeks to make oneself recog-
nisable are never precisely one’s own (Butler 2001, 23–26; Kowal 2015, 111). In many rec-
ognition policies, those norms disproportionately reflect the assumptions, values and
interests of either the state or those who have been designated spokespersons for the
group seeking recognition, and reify, simplify or warp the identities, practices and con-
cepts of group members. Paradoxically, pursuing recognition can hence involve extensive
self-distortion in order to render oneself legible to the state and its publics. In a seminal
analysis of this dynamic, Povinelli (2002, 55–57) describes how Aboriginal Australians
seeking recognition for native title claims are required to conjure forth an ‘impossible’
indigenous subject grounded in national imaginaries of ‘traditional’ Aboriginality, but
purged of anything considered repugnant by liberal multiculturalists. ‘Recognition’ in
such circumstances is not just a form of institutionalised misrecognition; it is a
‘cunning’ means of domination (2002, 6).
Self-distortion can hurt. It may require subjects to ‘sacrific[e] sincerity’ and thereby
compromise their broader moral commitments (Sylvain 2014, 253). The cruelty of the
misrecognition can itself generate feelings of injury, outrage and defiance (Muehlmann
2008). Moreover, if subjects establish an identification with the fantasised figure of
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themselves, they risk being ‘affectively constitute[d] as melancholic subjects’ whose dis-
tance from the state-sanctioned ideal is a source of distress, guilt and shame (Povinelli
2002, 56). Attending critically to recognition’s conditionality can thus illuminate why sub-
jects who receive recognition may relate to it, and themselves, unhappily.
Such arguments should ostensibly apply to the Confucianist case since Indonesia’s con-
stitutional commitment to monotheism and self-cultivation as a ‘godly nation’ (Menchik
2014, 595) has led to extensive state control over what is considered a legitimate pathway
to God. In 1952, traditions that did not meet state-imposed criteria of monotheism, sacred
scripture and prophetism were designated mere ‘currents of belief’ (aliran kepercayaan) by
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and their leaders informed that recognition would be
withheld until they could ‘homogenize and rationalize their belief systems along mono-
theistic lines’ (Sezgin and Künkler 2014, 464). This process, which Hefner (2011, 73)
terms ‘religionization’, often proved divisive and painful. When Balinese reformers
seeking to meet state requirements refashioned their Hinduism as a monotheistic world
religion anchored in a tradition traceable to India, an ‘unresolved tension’ arose
between the new vision of ‘Hindu religion’ and the local customs (adat) revered by
many Balinese, precipitating new forms of anxiety and self-consciousness regarding
ritual practice (Howe 2001, 149–150). Chia (2018, 57–59) similarly describes how
attempts to render Indonesian Buddhism monotheistic led to a schism of the Sangha.
Confucianism’s ‘religionisation’, however, has generated few such tensions. This partly
reflects its distinctive history in Indonesia. In the late nineteenth century, Confucianism
had been embraced as a set of ‘noble, beautiful and useful… teachings’ that could be
used to restore a sense of ‘Chineseness’ amongst Java’s heavily acculturated, mixed-
blood Peranakan Chinese (see Chambert-Loir 2015, 81–93). However, when, in 1902,
the Dutch missionary Tiemersma published polemical claims that ‘the Chinese as a
people had degenerated’ because they ‘lack[ed] a proper religion of their own’, some
Chinese championed Confucianism as ‘the religion of the Chinese’, deeming it equal,
even superior, to Christianity (Coppel 1989, 126). As Hoon (2013, 165) notes, they appro-
priated many of the latter’s institutional forms and operational mechanisms in order to
prove their case: ‘partly in reaction to the criticisms of the Christians… [they] institutio-
nalized Confucianism into an organized religion with godhead, prophet, scriptures, creeds
and rituals’. The Confucianism advocated by Indonesia’s central Confucianist organis-
ation, founded in 1923 as the Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee (Central Assembly of Confucian-
ism) and renamed in 1955 as MATAKIN (Indonesian Supreme Council for the
Confucianist Religion), thus conformed to many of the state’s criteria for religion even
before these were rendered explicit.
As the New Order sought to delegitimise Confucianism, officials seized on its lack of
clear beliefs regarding the afterlife as evidence it was not truly a ‘religion’. Ironically,
this ‘lack’ had once been cited as proof that Confucianism was more rational than other
religions, for how could the Prophet Confucius have written about an afterlife that he
was yet to experience? (Coppel 2002, 306). From the 1980s onwards, however,
MATAKIN has tasked its highest-ranking clerics (xueshi) with conceptualising the after-
life’s relationship to worldly deeds (see Sutrisno 2018, 104–108). Far from interpreting this
development as a state-imposed distortion, the revivalists I met discussed it with excite-
ment and nationalistic pride. It was normal, they said, to wonder what happens after
death. By developing a robust theology on this issue, they believed Indonesian
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Confucianism would become ‘the most advanced Confucianism in the world’, an achieve-
ment rendering them assets to the nation. The state’s ‘disciplining influence’ (Hefner 2011,
73) was here experienced not as a constraint, but as an opportunity.
Friction could nevertheless have arisen from MATAKIN’s power, as spokespersons for
Indonesia’s entire Confucianist community, to determine what counts as legitimate Con-
fucianism. MATAKIN leaders are committed to a reformist faith that centres on the
worship of Thian (Heaven), conceptualised as an immanent force in human life. They
argue that Thian is best revered, and self-cultivation best achieved, via strict adherence
to the ethical principles revealed in the Analects and inspired devotion to exemplary
figures such as the warrior-sages depicted in temple statuary. Such views conflict with
the understanding of many Chinese Indonesians, including many I met in Bangka-Beli-
tung-Riau, that ‘Confucianism’ is the syncretic and improvisational ‘Chinese popular reli-
gion’ practiced by their ancestors, in which devotions are offered to a wide pantheon of
gods and historical figures in hope of their intervention into worldly affairs. Oriented
towards practical efficacy, rather than doctrinal consistency, it was precisely such
popular religion that reformist Confucianists in the early twentieth century blamed for
leading Indies Chinese into ‘darkness’ and ‘difficulties’ (Coppel 2002, 262–263).
Such a disjuncture between centralised and local conceptions of Confucianism has
occasionally created discomfort. When Mr. Tjandrawinata, a senior MATAKIN cleric,
visited the Riau Islands town of Tanjung Pinang to inaugurate its local MAKIN (Confu-
cianist Council), several local revivalists found his actions unsettling.3 He inaugurated the
MAKIN via a ‘baptism’ (baptis), in which Council committee members all drank from a
cup, pledging to increase their knowledge of Confucianism, work hard and fight against
discrimination. He then gave a sermon and asked the congregation to recite a prayer
from a liturgical booklet. These unfamiliar ritual forms garnered mixed reactions. Some
attendees were enthusiastic about the ceremony, arguing that it represented the fully
fledged religion that their syncretic Confucianism could have become had its development
not been impeded by derecognition. Others found it disconcertingly alien. They had not
realised this was the kind of practice for which their revivalism was advocating.
Overall, however, re-recognition has yet to result in many Confucianists being sub-
jected to MATAKIN’s normalising gaze. A conversation with Mr. Tjandrawinata after
the inauguration ceremony revealed why. He had been unimpressed by Tanjung
Pinang’s Confucianists, he explained, deeming them ‘empty-headed’ people whose prac-
tices would eventually need radical reform. Currently, however, his priority was simply
to bring Chinese Indonesians (back) to Confucianism. MATAKIN was willing to tolerate
popular religious practice on the part of its affiliates because it still considered it ‘Confu-
cianism’, albeit of an impure variety. Consequently, although local revivalists were subject
to training and oversight by MATAKIN, in practice they retained considerable license to
allow syncretic ritual practices in their temples.
In sum, the realisation that recognition practices can misrecognise their recipients in
ways that lead to outrage, self-alienation or a sense of moral compromise, proves valuable
in many contexts, including some cases of religious recognition in Indonesia. By happen-
stance, however, Confucianists have had to do little of the painful self-modification that
has historically been required of Indonesia’s Buddhists and Hindus, while the ‘Confucia-
nist’ category by which they are recognised can currently accommodate wide diversities of
belief and practice. That feelings of disquiet and moral turmoil have nevertheless been
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evident amongst some (but not all) Confucianist revivalists suggests there would be value
in exploring additional theories of post-recognition affect.
Differentiating Recognition Psychologies
Critiques of recognition’s conditionality do not necessarily dispute the relational psychol-
ogy at the Hegelian heart of Honneth and Taylor’s recognition theory, although they cer-
tainly question how successfully its principles can be translated into statecraft. A parallel
critique, advanced by McNay (2008), argues that the very idea of a ‘struggle for recog-
nition’ is less universal and primal a psychic dynamic than recognition theorists
purport. McNay advocates a constructivist view in which subjects’ investment in, desire
for and responsiveness to recognition reflect their positionality within broader systems
of power and are thus differentiated by factors such as gender, class and race. She cites
Fanon’s (1967, 163–173) observation that in the colonial Antilles, the racialised inequal-
ities of power were too vast for Hegelian recognition’s conditions of ‘absolute reciprocity’
to be attained; Antilleans’ subordination derived not just from misrecognition ‘but from
historically entrenched processes of overdetermination, where [they were] not free to be
anything other than black’ (McNay 2008, 55). Merely granting recognition in such circum-
stances cannot fully redress such subordination, nor the conflicted relations-to-self it
fosters.
McNay’s argument is highly relevant to the Indonesian case, given that Confucianism’s
re-recognition has occurred within the context of an ongoing racial politics that has
marked ‘the Chinese’ out as problematically different ever since colonial times. Consider
the case of Hartono, a revivalist from Tanjung Pinang. Hartono felt it a priority to increase
Confucianism’s representation in local branches of the FKUB (Forum for Harmony
amongst Religious Communities) – a view with which the MATAKIN leadership con-
curred. A semi-governmental organisation with branches in every district of Indonesia,
the FKUB aims to pre-empt religious conflict by establishing strong, mutually respectful
relationships amongst the leaders of different religions. Hartono saw it as an opportunity
to cultivate relationships with Muslim and Christian leaders who could serve as allies
should Confucianism’s status ever be questioned in the future. Those same relationships
could also be mobilised if fresh waves of anti-Chinese discrimination ever broke out in
Indonesia. Since it was almost always Chinese Indonesians who followed Confucianism,
a Confucianist seat on the FKUB was a guaranteed Chinese seat. Buddhist seats, by con-
trast (let alone those allocated to Christians or Muslims), could potentially be seized by
hostile Indonesians of non-Chinese descent, since a significant minority of Indonesian
Buddhists are Javanese. With FKUB seats allocated in proportion to the number of adher-
ents that each religion had within the district, Hartono considered it vital that as many
Chinese Indonesians as possible register as Confucianist so this important opportunity
for protection could be fully exploited.
Hartono’s distinctive subjectivity as a Chinese Indonesian living in the wake of pro-
longed anti-Chinese discrimination led him to see the revival not only as the reversal of
historical injustice or the building of a thriving community of faith but as a strategic
investment in the future of Indonesia’s entire Chinese minority. This, in turn, rendered
him intensely and anxiously invested in the identifications of others around him. By fol-
lowing McNay (2008, 60) and examining how ‘hierarchies of power are internalized as
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psychic dispositions’, we can appreciate that more may be at stake in Confucianism’s re-
recognition than one’s present relation-to-self, such that the progress of the revival as a
whole might elicit particular ‘moral moods’ (Throop 2014): a joyful sense that all was
right with the world if the revival were to flourish, perhaps, or an aggrieved fury if it
did not.
However, McNay’s approach also has limits, insofar as it binds Confucianists’ subjec-
tive investment in the revival to the psychic effects of structural power relations, and their
occupation of a specific sociological category. It consequently struggles to account for the
marked experiential differentiation amongst revivalists inhabiting the same structural pos-
ition (wealthy, male, Chinese), or for the different rates of revivalism amongst ostensibly
similar Chinese Indonesian populations. Such ethnographic complexity indicates the need
to complement the critical approaches reviewed thus far with parallel anthropology of rec-
ognition, one centred on moral experience.
Recognition as Moral Disruption
To take a first-person moral perspective on an ethnographic moment is to consider what,
morally, is experienced, understood and at stake for each social actor present, in their bio-
graphical particularity. It acknowledges that people are subjects of history, born into a
world that both precedes and exceeds them, which structurally delimits their capacities
for action, and which discursively, and perhaps even psychically, disposes them towards
some courses of action over others. However, whilst recognising that action is never a
merely individual affair, it also insists on seeing social actors as subjects with historicity,
in the phenomenological sense, locating their actions within their broader ‘life trajectories’:
temporal arcs that encompass the past events and longer-term intentions and senses of
future possibility that shape their moral commitments (Mattingly 2014, 18–21). As
Keane (2016, 260) argues, the exclusion of first-person moral perspectives would render
any account of ethical life incomplete, and, as we have seen, they already inform those
studies of recognition that explore how the pursuit of conditional recognition can lead
subjects to become morally unmoored (for example Povinelli 2002; Sylvain 2014). Here,
however, I advance a further claim: that, regardless of how it has been pursued, recog-
nition’s receipt is intrinsically morally consequential.
This claim builds on work that adopts a first-person moral perspective to understand
how people are affected by life-changing events like violence, accidents and medical diag-
noses (including Das 2007; Kuan 2017; Mattingly 2014). The circumstances such events
precipitate demand response, and yet while social imaginaries and ethical traditions
may equip subjects with a general sense of what is required (to be a ‘supportive
partner’, for instance), it is often unclear how those goals – which should be understood
as ‘moral projects’, attempts to act in the ‘right’ way – are best achieved. These are conse-
quently situations in which any action taken is necessarily experimental, shadowed by the
prospect of moral failure (Mattingly 2014, 5–17).
The granting or withdrawing of legal recognition can similarly be understood as life-
changing events. They transform the political and legal realities in which subjects
conduct their affairs and so may, as Das (2007, 64) describes for the Partition of India,
confront subjects anew with ‘the question of how one makes the world one’s own’. Attend-
ing to the moral peril inherent in such a situation reminds us that the experiential
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consequences of recognition decisions are not limited to their immediate psychological
impact (cf. Honneth 1995), nor to the general feeling-tones associated with the new
social reality those decisions inaugurate, such as ‘euphoria’. Subjects must respond in
some way to their new circumstances and their responsive (in)action will itself have
moral and affective consequences. Klopotek’s (2011, 10) study of Louisiana Indians cap-
tures this point very effectively, concluding that what matters most ‘for tribal wellbeing is
not [recognition] decisions themselves but how the tribes respond to those decisions’.
However, nobody responds to recognition decisions ab initio. They encounter them,
and the challenges they present, against the backdrop of their pre-existing life trajectories
– a point of great significance for theorising post-recognition subjectivities. Insofar as rec-
ognition confronts subjects with a situation that demands ethical response, it may var-
iously negate, refract or fortify subjects’ previous projects of moral striving. Moreover,
subjects’ capacity to respond to this new situation as they might wish depends on the
virtues, abilities and social capital they have cultivated whilst responding to their previous
historical circumstances. Finally, these differential capacities to respond to new circum-
stances in a morally appropriate manner can invite invidious comparisons with others.
For all these reasons, recognition can precipitate new moral evaluations of one’s life as
hitherto lived, producing complicated new relations-to-self, the affective tonality of
which may vary considerably. It has an intrinsic capacity for moral disruption. We can
thus modify Klopotek’s argument (cited above), to conclude that recognition decisions
matter just as much for ‘wellbeing’ as people’s responses to them, because the moral dis-
ruption engendered by those decisions is integral to how any such responses are
experienced.
This can be seen very clearly in the Indonesian case. Confucianism’s re-recognition was
visited upon people who, despite their similar structural position, had lived very differently
prior to its receipt. Re-recognition consequently had a broad range of moral and affective
consequences, with significant implications for the extent and character of local Confucia-
nist revivals.
Outrage in Tanjung Pinang
Let us return to Hartono’s story. While the Riau Islands never saw any outbreaks of anti-
Chinese violence, Hartono’s life was nevertheless shattered by the New Order’s discrimi-
natory policies. A teenager when the regime came to power, his school was closed down
and eventually demolished, simply because Chinese was its language of instruction. He
was forced to abandon his Chinese name in favour of a more ‘Indonesian-sounding’
moniker, and he watched the local temples in which his family had worshipped for gen-
erations be seized by Buddhists and removed from Confucianist control.
After Confucianism’s derecognition led to many Chinese Indonesians being automati-
cally registered as ‘Buddhist’ on their identity cards, Tanjung Pinang’s Buddhist organis-
ations put great effort into strengthening these new religious identifications. Having taken
over syncretic temples, the Buddhists did not remove the statues of much-loved folk gods
such as Dabogong (the earth god) or Mazu (protectress of fishermen), but rearranged the
temples so that Buddha statues occupied the central altars, allowing visitors to continue
with their ‘traditional’ practices whilst simultaneously exposing them to Buddhist practice
and theology.4 Former Confucianists described Buddhist missionaries subjecting them to
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daily harassment until they started visiting the temples. Others attended of their own voli-
tion, often hoping that active familial participation would allow their children to score
highly in their obligatory religious education exams. Few such converts identified as ‘Bud-
dhist’ to begin with, but after many years of exposure to Buddhist theology, they found
they began to believe it.
Hartono watched all this from a distance. Refusing to surrender his Confucianism and
start practicing Buddhism, which he considered ‘an Indian religion’, he was disgusted by
the ‘cowardice’ of other Chinese. He largely boycotted the temples, instead performing
‘Confucianist’ rituals at his domestic altar. Frustrated by the restrictions on his religious
practice, he nonetheless felt he was acting with the utmost integrity given his situation.
His friends admired his courage and single-mindedness. However, his actions left him
in a difficult position once Confucianism was re-recognised.
Hartono had expected many of Tanjung Pinang’s Chinese to convert back to Confu-
cianism as soon as it was legal. That less than 2% did so was a crushing disappointment.5
Many had come to feel quite comfortable within Buddhism, justifying their inertia with
claims that all religions were ‘equally good’ or ‘different paths to the same God’ – plati-
tudes that, in Hartono’s view, overlooked the crucial point that not all these paths were
equally Chinese. Others embraced the newly recognised Confucianism, but saw it as a sup-
plement to, rather than substitute for, Buddhism. Anis, the 30-year old daughter of two
Confucianists, is a typical example:
[Buddhism and Confucianism] aren’t the same, but I believe in both. I am a Confucianist. But
ask me to go to a vihara (Buddhist temple) and I’m up for that too. Both of them are my
religions… .
It’s rare to get a fanatic who says ‘I’m a Confucianist, I don’t want anything to do with Bud-
dhism’. Because let’s say you pray to a statue of your favourite Confucianist god in your
house. When you go to the temple, you want to pray to the same god. But there’s no way
that you’d ignore any of the other statues in the temple. So you start praying to the
Buddha as well… . Finally, you believe in both religions.
Such emergent claims to ‘having two religions’ resonate with the long-standing idea of
there being three Chinese religions (Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism) and it being
‘impossible for a person to practice only one because the belief system of the Chinese
incorporate[s] principles from all three’ (Suryadinata 1997, 149). It was on these very
grounds that a ‘Three Religions Society’ (Sam Kauw Hwee) was established in 1934, the
founders hoping to counter the narrow definition of ‘Chineseness’ that animated reformist
Confucianism (Suryadinata 1997, 148–153). Interestingly, there has been a nationwide
resurgence of interest in the Sam Kauw Hwee – or, as it is now known, Tridharma –
since Confucianism’s re-recognition (Hauser-Schäublin 2014), suggesting many Chinese
Indonesians wish to engage with Confucianist theology alongside, rather than to the exclu-
sion of, alternative and seemingly incompatible doctrines. For Hartono, however, this
offered cold comfort since Tridharma was formally a Buddhist organisation. Not only
does Buddhism assume priority in Tridharma activities and spaces (Figure 1), Tridharma
affiliation also directs state funding – and the FKUB seats in which Hartono was intensely
invested – to Buddhists rather than Confucianists.6
Consequently, while many Tanjung Pinang Chinese were enthusiastic about Confu-
cianism’s re-recognition, and the freedom it offered to incorporate Confucianist elements
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into their Buddhism, Hartono was left with a profound sense of outrage that the Confu-
cianist revival was not unfolding in the way he had imagined or wanted it to. He railed
against the ‘wickedness’ of Indonesia’s Buddhists, deploring the way that something as
simple as introducing Buddha statues to temples had generated Buddhist sensibilities
within people who had once been Confucianist. He hoped the revival would get stronger
– but there was little he himself could do to help. The oppositional stance that had allowed
him to preserve his sense of integrity and moral virtue after derecognition had also created
a rift between him and those he was hoping to reconvert; his insistent claims to Buddhist-
identifying friends and neighbours that their everyday rituals were ‘actually Confucianist’
had little effect beyond straining those relationships. Some, like Anis, dismissed him as a
‘fanatic’. Nor could he do much to regain control of any temples – a measure he imagined
would put pressure on regular worshippers to convert (back). His lifetime of shunning the
Buddhist leaders who had ‘colonised’ (menguasai) his religion had deprived him of the
connections needed to persuade local Buddhist associations to relinquish their control.
What had seemed like a wise and virtuous course of action under derecognition now
left him a moral failure, unable to achieve what he wanted the most.
Figure 1. Inside a Tridharma visitor centre on Bangka. The Buddha is central, with Lao-Zi to his left and
Confucius to his right. The lotus flower on the floor and Buddha image above the altar also indicate
Buddhist predominance. Photo by author.
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Tragedy in Lingga
Like Hartono, Frangky – a charismatic revivalist from the Riau Island district of Lingga –
considered Confucianism’s resurgence essential for protecting Indonesia’s Chinese. He
also stood to gain personally: as a perceived gatekeeper of ‘the Confucianist vote’, he
anticipated receiving honours and favours from aspiring politicians. Nevertheless, as in
Tanjung Pinang, Lingga’s Confucianist revival had only recruited a small percentage of
the district’s Chinese population.7
The roots of Frangky’s difficulties lay, like Hartono’s, in his actions whilst Confucian-
ism was derecognised. With Mahayana Buddhists taking over temples and imperilling the
syncretic ‘Confucianist’ practice to which he felt attached, Frangky had conferred with his
friends and reached a drastic decision. He would train to become a Buddhist cleric. This
was not a sincere conversion. Frangky was entering Buddhism undercover, ‘shuddering as
[he] did so’, aiming to appear credible enough to be entrusted with managing his village
temple. He would – and did – then preserve it as a space in which the popular religious
practices long enacted in the village continued to be performed despite their formal
interdiction.
Becoming involved in organised Mahayana Buddhism allowed Frangky to maintain a
Confucianist space in Lingga’s public life. It also led him to view Mahayana Buddhists
somewhat differently from Hartono. Many of Frangky’s counterparts in his Buddhist
organisation had joined not because of theological convictions but a desire to preserve
their island’s Chinese heritage. Their swift ‘take-over’ of temples and introduction of Bud-
dhist iconography were not intended as acts of ‘colonisation’, as Hartono claimed, but acts
of salvage.8 Rendering a temple legibly Buddhist would prevent its destruction, allowing it
to be used by local Chinese of any or no religious persuasions, just as it had by their fore-
bears, for whom temples had functioned as community hubs. Many were themselves
ambivalent about the ontological precepts of formal Buddhism. Others, whilst committed
Buddhists, nevertheless tolerated unorthodox or Confucianist practice in the temples out
of solidarity with fellow victims of anti-Chinese discrimination.
Such tolerance proved important when a new public prosecutor arrived on Lingga and
saw Frangky preparing a suckling pig for the Festival of Hungry Ghosts. Understanding
that Mahayana Buddhism recommended a vegetarian diet, he accused Frangky of illegally
hosting ‘Chinese festivities’ in his temple. Luckily, the Mahayana Buddhists said nothing
to counteract Frangky’s claim that the rituals he was preparing were ‘a type of Buddhism’
and therefore permissible under Suharto’s Presidential Instructions. The prosecutor even-
tually dropped the case, leaving Frangky convinced that without the tacit support of his
Mahayana colleagues he would have faced considerable difficulties.
Those feelings of indebtedness left Frangky in a tricky situation once Confucianism had
been re-recognised. The resurgence of MATAKIN and the establishment of local MAKINs
meant that, if Frangky was to remain as a Confucianist leader, he needed to sunder his ties
to Mahayana Buddhism. This in itself had been difficult for Frangky. He had worried that
his Mahayana friends might feel betrayed. More difficult still was pressurising Mahayana
organisations to release the temples they had ‘saved’. Though Frangky often boasted that
his knowledge of Buddhism gave him better negotiating skills than revivalists like
Hartono, he struggled to ask his friends and former allies – people who had protected
him from the prosecutor – to renounce the high-status roles as temple organisers to
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 13
which they had dedicated their lives. He worried that wresting control of the temples
would be an insult to the efforts and risks the Mahayana Buddhists had undertaken to
ensure that there were still temples to wrangle over.
Frangky faced a moral tragedy, caught between two incommensurable ethical claims.9
Yet this was only the case because what had formerly been two commensurable goods –
the expression of his Confucianism and solidarity with his Mahayana friends – had been
rendered incommensurable by the world-changing force of legal recognition, turning a
life of which he had once felt proud into one he viewed with regret. ‘Under Suharto,
how were we to know that Gus Dur would suddenly reverse all the laws?’ he lamented.
‘How could we have predicted the fall of Suharto, or that his fall would lead to a com-
pletely different kind of regime with a completely different attitude to us, the Chinese? If
we’d known, we’d have definitely adopted a different strategy. We’d have waited. But
there was no end in sight, so we paired up with the Buddhists. It’s what we thought
we had to do to survive.’
The last time I saw him, Frangky had yet to reclaim any temples. He appeared to be
stalling for time, throwing his energies into alternative revival projects, such as converting
Lingga’s historically animist populations of orang laut. I wondered whether he really
needed more time, or was simply trying to defer the painful confrontation he knew was
imminent. Frangky himself claimed it was necessary to handle the situation ‘slowly and
democratically’ as pushing too hard, too soon, could ensnare the temple in a protracted
legal dispute. He argued that if the demand to switch back to Confucianism came from
the temple congregation, then the Mahayana Buddhists would agree to surrender their
control. Villagers who worshipped at his temple, however, told me they had long been
making such demands and were frustrated with Frangky’s reluctance to act. In the mean-
time, they stayed registered as Buddhist, reluctant to affiliate with a religion that had no
formal place of worship in their village, and gritted their teeth as visiting dignitaries
addressed them as ‘Buddhists’ during their temple festivities. The incapacitating force of
Frangky’s dilemma had stripped his congregation of an opportunity to reap the full
rewards of re-recognition, compounding his feelings of regret and despair.
Triumph in Bangka
Compared to Tanjung Pinang and Lingga, the swampy tin-rich island of Bangka feels
palpably more Confucianist. The island’s bustling oldest temple stands chock-full of
offerings (mainly mangoes and sacks of rice) adorned with signed documents declaring
they have ‘been offered up in a spirit of thanks to Thian’. Evy, an elderly Chinese lady
who visits this temple every day, told me that ‘People [on Bangka] are devout in our reli-
gion. We have to be. Thian is watching over us!’ These repeated references to Thian –
reformist Confucianism’s conception of the Supreme Being – are striking.
A soft-spoken solicitor named Arie stands at the helm of what is arguably Indonesia’s
most successful Confucianist revival. Bangka was home to over a third of all Confucianist-
identifying Indonesians in the 2010 census, and the island’s MAKINs have been remark-
ably successful at (re)gaining control of temples.10 In Arie’s sub-district alone, 26 temples
were in Confucianist hands. Though Arie is not solely responsible for such achievements,
his story illuminates why Bangka’s revivalists have succeeded when their counterparts
elsewhere have encountered so many difficulties.
14 N. J. LONG
Arie had been brought up Confucianist but accepted the Buddhist identity imposed on
him under the New Order, despite his latent Confucianist identification. Dissimulating as
a Buddhist was not onerous for him; he lived in a small town where, unlike Tanjung
Pinang, Buddhism was not promoted with much force. He was subject to minimal surveil-
lance. Indeed, he gave little thought to religion, focusing instead on his work. Besides his
legal career, he established a travel agency that became the preferred supplier for local gov-
ernment offices and worked as a court translator for Chinese defendants who could not
speak Indonesian. Only in 2008, when Confucianism had been re-recognised but the reli-
gious affiliation of Bangka’s temples remained unclear, did Arie decide to get involved in
organised religion. He suggested to his friends that they establish a Confucianist organis-
ation, made contact with MATAKIN and secured the permits required to establish eleven
MAKINs across Bangka.
For revivalists like Hartono, Arie cuts a morally problematic figure. Under the New
Order, he had willingly abandoned Confucianism in pursuit of his own safety – actions
suggesting weakness of character. Arie himself felt ambivalent about his past, explaining
he had been ‘trauma-tised’ (ditrauma) by ‘the events of 1967’.11 1967 was the year
Suharto issued several Presidential directives restricting Chinese cultural practices.
Though Arie did not mention this explicitly, it was also the year of Indonesia’s worst
ever episode of anti-Chinese violence; up to 5000 Chinese Indonesians were murdered
at military behest in West Kalimantan (Chong 2016, 100). ‘The trauma took away all
my courage (keberanian)’, he elaborated, ‘It would have been impossible for me to do any-
thing [back then].’ Knowing that Confucianism had been legally re-recognised, he said,
had given him the confidence to act.
Arie believed that revivalists who, like Frangky or Hartono, were struggling to recover
temples and adherents ‘lacked the necessary courage’ because they were ‘still trauma-tised’
by New Order policy. Such an analysis simultaneously absolved these revivalists of respon-
sibility (since they were victims of discrimination) whilst positing them as Arie’s moral
inferiors because, unlike him, they had not overcome their trauma and were consequently
failing in their duties as revival leaders. ‘Leaders have to act’, he emphasised. ‘What will
happen if we don’t? Just last year, there was an attempt to register a temple as a site of
Buddhist heritage. If I hadn’t opposed that, we’d have never have got it back.’ Arie sus-
pected himself to be ‘the most courageous’ of all Indonesia’s Confucianists, and hoped
his example would inspire other revivalists to overcome their traumas and become
more efficacious.
While Arie’s attribution of his success to the confidence occasioned by Confucianism’s
legal re-recognition should not be dismissed, an alternative analysis is possible. His actions
during the derecognition era – ‘cowardly’ to some – had inadvertently left him exception-
ally well-placed to ‘courageously’ spearhead a revival following re-recognition. Particularly
important were the strong relationships he had cultivated with local officials whilst hand-
ling their travel contracts. He used these connections to persuade Bangka’s Ministry of
Religion that, if the island’s census data was to be top-quality, it should urge the public
to declare their true religious identifications, regardless of what was written on their iden-
tity cards. A public announcement to that effect was duly issued, doubtless influencing
Bangka’s subsequent high Confucianist census count. Most important was Arie’s friend-
ship with Yusuf, the former head of the district Ministry of Religion, for whom Arie had
handled several inheritance claims. Having lobbied to get Yusuf appointed as the head of
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the local FKUB, Arie leaned on his friend for help with reclaiming temples. ‘There was a
bit of difficulty at first’, Yusuf admitted, ‘the Buddhists wanted to keep the temples. But I
explained to them we need to safeguard harmony between religions, and it’s written in the
law that Confucianists have the right to reclaim their former temples’. Temple reclamation
was also facilitated by Arie’s discovery that a Mahayana religious site had recently opened
without securing the necessary permits. In the interests of ‘safeguarding harmony’, he and
Yusuf had suggested the site’s legal irregularities could be overlooked if only a few temples
were returned to Confucianists. The Buddhists had been furious, but there was nothing
they could do.
Meanwhile, Arie’s lack of close relationships with Buddhists spared him the heartache
faced by revivalists like Frangky. Arie considered himself ‘a little bit hard’ (sedikit keras) –
a quality associated with efficacy and determination, but also the negative traits of heart-
lessness and self-interest. It was not something of which Arie sounded proud: he, like
Frangky, recognised something tragic in what the revival required of him. However,
unlike Frangky, Arie felt no indebtedness to the Buddhists that the revival would necess-
arily thwart. They were not his friends, not his former allies – just acquaintances. Besides,
he said, his years in the courtroom had convinced him that one should set aside personal
feelings in the name of justice. Rather than a source of crippling moral tragedy, Arie saw
being ‘a little bit hard’ as a necessary, if unpleasant, aspect of acting ‘courageously’, for
which the success of the revival proved his vindication.
Legal recognition was no less morally disruptive for Arie than for Hartono and
Frangky. Arie, however, got to enjoy a positive ‘disruption’. In the world recognition pro-
duced, all the skills, virtues and contacts he had acquired whilst previously cultivating
himself as a lawyer-cum-entrepreneur allowed him to experience himself anew as extra-
ordinarily efficacious, the most courageous Confucianist in all Indonesia, and an exemplar
for others. He could narrate his life as one of moral triumph. Nevertheless, while Arie tried
to explain away the inconvenient truth that, while acquiring these skills and contacts, he
had done nothing to defend Confucianism, this detail was rarely lost on those revivalists
whose incapacities to act were a direct consequence of their life-long commitment to their
religion. That people such as Arie should be more successful than them when they had
taken such risks, shown such integrity and made so many sacrifices, merely compounded
their enduring sense that the world was unfair, heightening the despondency that charac-
terised their experience of recognition.
Conclusion
I opened this article by asking why the experiential and practical consequences of Confu-
cianism’s re-recognition should have varied so widely across Indonesia. Whilst acknowl-
edging the importance of long-standing racial politics to the contemporary Confucianist
experience, and the ways recognition’s conditionality can require its recipients to self-
distort, I have argued this question can only be fully answered by understanding recog-
nition as a moment of moral disruption.
Re-recognition did yield genuine pleasures, marking an end to years of injustice, remov-
ing the stigma of belonging to a derecognised religion, andofferingmembership of the Indo-
nesian nation on (more or less) one’s own terms. Although the legacies of anti-Chinese
discrimination still fuelled anxieties that such benefits might one day be withdrawn, there
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was still plenty to feel ‘euphoric’ about. However, these were pleasures derived from enjoy-
ing re-recognition in the abstract, as formal, decontextualisedChinese citizen-subjects. Seen
in the context of individual life trajectories, matters weremore complex. Revivalists’ experi-
ences of re-recognition were differentiated by the extent to which their actions under the
New Order left them well-placed to recruit adherents and seize temples. Some, like Arie,
got to experience themselves as efficacious, successful moral actors. Others, especially
those who had remained committed to Confucianism following its derecognition, found
themselves confronted with insurmountable practical and moral difficulties. I have
focused here on just two such examples, but they were cases to which many revivalists
could relate. Indeed, after Mr. Tjandrawinata, the MATAKIN cleric, heard of Hartono
and Frangky’s difficulties in the Riau Islands, he noted that similar problems were hamper-
ing the revival across Indonesia – hence, I suggest, its sclerotic overall pace. These dynamics
led many revivalists to have deeply ambivalent experiences of recognition. They also had
broader ramifications for Confucianist-identifying populations, who had uneven opportu-
nities to express their identifications in public, and were not always able to enjoy the plea-
sures of recognition as fully as they might have liked.
With this argument, I have sought to offer a new way of understanding the contempor-
ary Chinese Indonesian experience. Indonesia’s Chinese are often studied as a racial and
religious minority, the politics of their cultural and religious life understood in terms of
their relations with the state and the autochthonous Muslim majority (see Sai and
Hoon 2013). Such frameworks cannot explain phenomena such as the tremendous diver-
sification of the Chinese Indonesian religious landscape, with some districts developing
robust Confucianist communities while others witness the enduring dominance of
Mahayana Buddhism or the rise of syncretic movements like Tridharma. Accounting
for these phenomena requires attention to the emergent cultural politics within the
Chinese minority, as set in motion by post-Suharto Indonesia’s various reforms. These
are complex and unpredictable. They cannot even be straightforwardly reduced to
conflicts between particular ‘sub-groups’, such as ‘Buddhists’ versus ‘Confucianists’ (cf.
Ong 2008) because they are meaningfully shaped by the locally specific ways in which
Chinese Indonesians’ lives became mutually imbricated or opposed under the New
Order. Given this complexity, first-person moral perspectives offer important insights
into the motivations and stakes underlying particular Chinese Indonesians’ social
action. From their diverse individual stories, however, arises a more general critical
insight: that the impact of New Order discrimination continues to be widely felt,
despite – indeed, sometimes because of – policies that sought to overturn it.
I have also sought to contribute to critical recognition scholarship. At present, this field
overwhelmingly focuses on power relations when trying to understand why recognition’s
emancipatory promise is not borne out in practice. Focusing on the phenomenology of
moral experience yields additional insights, most crucially that recognition has an inherent
capacity to be morally disruptive. Such disruption can have positive consequences, as
Arie’s story shows. It can also be devastating. Because recognition catapults subjects
into political and legal realities that may demand different skills, virtues and resources
from those that had characterised their lives previously, it can easily convert a life well-
lived into a life ill-judged.
Das (2007, 75–76) has written of how, for her informant Asha, the ‘brutality’ of the Par-
tition ‘lay in what violence could do to alter the ways in which kin recognise or withhold
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recognition from each other’. My ethnographic materials show how recognition can be
similarly brutal. It put an end to the world in which Frangky and Hartono could experi-
ence themselves as virtuous actors, recasting them as subjects who were struggling to
achieve their moral goals. They were transformed in the eyes of others: Hartono from a
paragon of single-minded refusal to a laughable fanatic; Frangky from a courageous
risk-taker to an ineffectual liability. The recognition they gained from the state disrupted
the established bases of their social and self-recognition. It presented them with moral
dilemmas that were painful in their own right, compounding these miseries with the
humiliation of watching more morally questionable others, like Arie, achieve the very
things they could not. Though they might have hoped re-recognition would ‘straighten
what’s crooked’, it plunged them into a world that itself felt horribly awry.
This is not to suggest that recognition should have been withheld. Nor is it to dispute
the importance of attending to power relations when studying recognition. It is, however,
to insist that investigating whether and how recognition disrupts subjects’ life trajectories
and moral biographies will always be relevant for understanding post-recognition subjec-
tivities. Anthropologists seeking to make recognition policy ‘better’ should hence not only
use their ethnographic expertise to ensure that the conditions of recognition are more
flexible and accurate (Merlan 2013), but also to anticipate the moral difficulties that receiv-
ing recognition might precipitate, investigate how these challenges might be circumvented,
and advocate that sufficient resources be devoted to their mediation. In this regard,
anthropologists should not let it be forgotten that the moral challenges faced by contem-
porary Confucianists would never have arisen had the Indonesian state not arrogated the
right to recognise some religions and disregard others in its early years, nor that these chal-
lenges have been compounded by an enduring bureaucratic presumption that citizens can
only be formally affiliated to one religious category at any one time. Following Balaton-
Chrimes and Stead’s (2017, 2) insistence that we reconsider ‘the fundamental valuation
of recognition as an innate good…within Northern political theory’ in favour of a
careful critique of the institutional arrangements from which acts of recognition
proceed, we might thus conclude that true justice for Chinese Indonesians will only
arise when the Indonesian state recognises not that they have a right to practice Confu-
cianism, but that it has a responsibility to implement reforms that address the harms sus-
tained over decades of its own discriminatory policies whilst minimising the prospects of
moral disruption, and the suffering and turmoil to which this can lead.
Notes
1. 2010 census figures were derived from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.1, with underlying data from BPS Statistics
Indonesia. 1971 figures are from Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta (2003).
2. The Confucianist revival has ostensibly fared even better in West Sumatra (165 Confucianists
in 1971 dropping to 121 in 2010) and North Sulawesi (154 growing to 463). However, these
numbers are so small that the changes could easily result from migration rather than revival.
3. All names are pseudonyms.
4. Some other regions witnessed complete ‘eradication of non-Buddhist elements’ (Ong 2008,
108).
5. The 2010 census records 416 Chinese Confucianists in Tanjung Pinang, just 1.7% of the
municipality’s 24,876 Chinese.
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6. Tridharma has had a longer-standing presence in some provinces. Tsuda (2012, 392) remarks
that ‘most Chinese temples in East Java’ joined the PTITD (Indonesian Association of Trid-
harma Places of Worship) in the 1960s and 1970s, which could explain why so few East Java-
nese identified as ‘Confucianist’ in the 2010 census.
7. The 2010 census records 335 Chinese Confucianists in Lingga, just 5.6% of the district’s 6016
Chinese.
8. Tsuda (2012, 392–393) describes similar dynamics in Central and East Java.
9. See Mattingly (2014, 99–121) for further discussion of ‘moral tragedy’ as an anthropological
analytic.
10. Of the 89,124 Bangka islanders who identified as ‘Chinese’ in the census, 34,020 (38.2%)
declared themselves Confucianist. A further 7038 Confucianists declared their ethnicity as
‘Bangka’.
11. Smith (2018) provides a genealogy of the trauma idiom in Indonesian discourses of suffering.
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